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1. DeGroot 1973
In (DeGroot 1973), Morrie DeGroot considers testing the one-dimensional
point-null hypothesis H0 : Xi  f(x)dx (here f(x) is a p.d.f. on R) against
the alternative that somehow the Xi's are \bigger" than that; thus the
P-value will be the right tail probability P(x) = [1   F(x)] for a single
observation X = x. He wishes to nd a way of making the alternative
precise in such a way that the tail-probability P(x) will have meaning in a
Likelihood or Bayesian analysis.
His solution is to set  := R and, for  2 , set
f(x) :=
f(x)
1   F()
1fxg;
the conditional density for X (under H0), given that X  , and let the alter-
native be (in his notation) K1 := ff(x)g. This is a stochastically increasing
family with a monotone likelihood ratio and the generalized likelihood ratio
against H0 (in favor of K1) is
(x) :=
sup2 f(x)
f(x)
=
supx f(x)=[1   F()]
f(x)
=
1
1   F(x)
;
so the P-value [1   F(x)] is just the LHR in favor of H0, P(x) = 1=(x).
Thus, for example, a P-value of 0:01 indicates that there exists an alternative
in K1 that is 100 times more likely than H0.
Later in the same paper DeGroot introduces a second alternative and pur-
sues a Bayesian approach. For  2  := Z+ he sets
g(x) := (1 + )F (x)f(x);
1p.d.f. for the maximum of 1+ independent random variables Xi  f(x)dx,
notes H0 = fg0g and sets K2 := fg :  > 0g. With an improper prior
distribution assigning probability
( = k) /
1
k + 1
; k 2  = Z+;
the (proper!) posterior distribution given X = x will be
( = k j X = x) / F k(x)f(x):
So long as 0 < F(x) < 1 for the observed value X = x, the geometric series P
k2 Fk(x) = [1   F(x)] 1, so we have
( = k j X = x) = [1   F(x)]F k(x)
and, in particular, the posterior probability of H0 is simply
( = 0 j X = x) = [1   F(x)];
identical to the P-value.
2. Efron 1986
Brad Efron (1986) has a delightful short paper with discussions by several
famous and opinionated statisticians addressing the question of why every-
one isn't Bayesian| he argues that (1) Fisher's theory is easier to apply
(although it must be said that this changed four years later with the pop-
ularization of Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods following the landmark
publication Gelfand and Smith (1990)), that (2) Fisher and Neyman-Pearson
methods both facilitate model building, that (3) Neyman-Pearson in par-
ticular makes it easy to break o small parts of big problems, and that (4)
Frequentist methods appear more objective. A great deal of work has been
done since 1986 on all four of those points; how would you characterize the
advantages and disadvantages of each approach now?
3. Berger and Sellke 1987
Jim Berger and Tom Sellke (1987) note that a classical test that rejects at
level  2 (0;1) will oer the frequentist guarantee that
P[Reject j H0 true]  ;
2but this oers no bound on how high P[H0] might be when one rejects; they
seek to calculate the other conditional probability
P[H0 true j Rejection with P  ];
and discover this may be far higher than . For example, a normal model
with null hypothesis H0 : fXig
iid  No(0;2) (with known 2 > 0) and
alternative H1 : fXig
iid  No(;2);  6= 0 with \fair" prior (H0) =
(H1) = 1=2, will have P-value
P(x) = 2
 
  j xn   0j
p
n=

;
approximately P  0:05 if j xn   0j  1:96=
p
n; for such an observation,
[H0 j X = x]  0:227
for every possible symmetric (about 0) distribution of 's mass on H1, and
[H0 j X = x]  0:128 even if we allow asymmetric distributions.
One interpretation is that for an investigator testing new hypotheses every
day, about half of which are true and about half false, at least 12:8% of the
hypotheses rejected at level   0:05 will be true (and at least 22:7% in the
symmetric case). For the Bayesian analysis to nd a posterior probability
of P[H0jx]  0:05 the Bayesian would require a prior distribution giving at
least [H1]  0:85, i.e., would have to begin with odds at least 11 : 2 against
H0.
4. Berger and Delampady 1987
Jim Berger and Mohan Delampady (1987) evaluate lower bounds for the
posterior probability of the null P[H0 j X] for a range of data models
fXig
iid  f(x j ) and prior distributions (d) for point-null hypotheses of
the form H0 :  = 0. They evaluate inma of P[H0 j X] for symmetric
unimodal priors , for priors from selected parametric families (e.g., con-
jugate distributions), and for \all" prior distributions; in general they nd
that P-values are often far lower than the minimum possible value of the
posterior probability of H0 (which they regard as an indictment of the use of
P-values as measures of evidence against H0), with little systematic relation
(precluding simple recalibration). They show this is not an artifact of the
\pointness" of the null hypothesis, by showing the phenomena persist for
near-point nulls of the form H0 : j   0j < , but (see below) it does seem
to depend on the two-sided nature of the tests they consider.
35. Casella and Berger 1987
George Casella and Roger (not Jim) Berger (1987), motivated by (Berger
and Delampady 1987), showed that in a variety of one-sided testing situa-
tions with monotone likelihood ratios, the P-value may be a lower bound for
the posterior probability of the null hypothesis H0 :   0 against H1 :  > 0,
for suitable ranges of prior distributions; in some non-MLR cases they found
that the P-value exceeded the lower bound, and hence was consistent with
at least one Bayesian expression of posterior probability.
6. Berger, Brown & Wolpert 1994
Jim Berger, Larry Brown, and I (1994) found a way of reconciling Fisher's
P-values and a conditional Bayesian posterior probability of a point null
hypothesis H0 :  = 0 against a point alternative hypothesis H1 :  = 1.
Their idea was to start with a statistic S that measures how \extreme" the
data are| they used
S(x) := min
 
P0[(X)  (x)]; P1[(X)  (x)]

;
equivalent to choosing the minimum of the P-values for the two tests of H0
against H1 and H1 against H0. They showed that the posterior probability
of H0 conditional on the value of S(X) is the same as the P-value whenever
the hypothesis is rejected. Particularly in the sequential setting, this oers a
way to have P-values inherit the Bayesian independence from the stopping
rules, a key advantage in complex testing situations.
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